2005_NPT_Comment

Comments on the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

Richard Wilson
Erice,
Tuesday August 23^rd 2005

In 1940 I saw a house destroyed by a 50 kilo bomb. 5 years later the largest bomb used in Europe in World war II was 2 tons - and that could destroy a city block. In 1944 I saw a V1 head on about 5 seconds before it exploded and killed a childhood friend. In August 1945 all that changed. The Hiroshima bomb had the equivalent of 20,000 tons of TNT and we now have bombs 100 times as powerful, and arsenals with 1000 of these. The scientists who built this bomb knew at once what they had done. A war with these weapons must not happen. The columnist Jonathan Schell has distinguished two approaches. That of Einstein and Szilard; and NPT to have a degree of international supervision and control and that proposed by General Groves that the US must never let another nation approach it in the military development of this technology. Until recently the Einsten-Szilard approach path was followed by Eisenhower in his Atoms for Peace speech and by NPT with a carrot as a reward for not making weapons and a stick to inspect and control. There was the hopeful plan for ultimate disarmament by the weapons states and perhaps even international control of a few (maybe even as many as 100) bombs by international authority. There is more recently a trend toward the Groves approach - and this puts the USA at odds with its friends many of whom feel the stick is used too much without carrots to compensate.

I claim that the biggest single incentive for a country to make an atomic bomb has been the attitude of the United States. In September 1945, when the USA unilaterally terminated the UK/USA wartime collaboration. About 1949 two cabinet ministers of the UK, independently of each other, told me in person that the reason UK made a bomb was not defense, but to be taken seriously by the US. This restored the "special relationship". The motive of France was similar - "La Gloire de la France". And China wanted to be taken seriously by the USSR. It is vital for the US to publicly and continuously respect the views of countries that could easily make nuclear bombs but have decided not to do so. These include Germany, Japan, Canada, Sweden and many others. It is not too late for this reversal in attitude that can reassure the world. Maybe if the US attitude changes, its leadership on this issue might be accepted by the rest of the world.

The US, and to a lesser extent other weapons states, could take other steps to reassure the world. I was scared when the USSR had 50 bombs. Why do we need thousands for a deterrent? Should we not, in our own interest get rid of most of them? Scientists, including a committee of the US National Academy of Sciences, argue that the USA would be safer under any proposed scenario if they signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Ratifying the treaty would instill confidence. Similarly the USA could return to the ABM treaty. It is also completely unclear to any of the friends of the US why the US has any legitimate need for new types of bomb. Abandoning the plans for new types of bombs would cost little and gain the US a lot. By taking a moral higher ground, and I do not necessarily mean the absolute moral high ground of complete disarmament, we would be in a better position to ask Iran to abandon their plans for uranium enrichment which have no purpose for their present civilian program. In that context I note that there has been improvement since 1970. Germany abandoned their proposal to sell a fuel processing plant to Brazil and France abandoned their proposal to sell a reprocessing plant to Pakistan. Iran is building its enrichment plant on its own. If they do so, their scientists will have time to contemplate what they are doing and hopefully come to the views of Einstein and Szilard. In that connection one must also note that the Iranian scientists were being encouraged in their present direction by many countries who were competing for their orders. Their desires to continue, with full international inspection, may be as much a matter of the professional pride of the scientists as anything else.

US administration lawyers (and even a few scientists of some distinction) have argued that suggested proposals such as mine go beyond the legal demands of article VI of NPT. Perhaps. But that may merely mean that NPT is irrelevant, or inadequate or both or worse. We should as scientists rethink what non proliferation needs and then consider politically whether NPT helps us to get there. To that extent I agree with Kamal.

I personally believe that the present attitude of the US government is determined by domestic political considerations. In this we as scientists have not done our job. We have failed to get our leaders to put a concern for prevention of use of nuclear weapons above domestic considerations. I am partially guilty. My children sensed my fear at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. I succeeded that far. But I have failed to get my grandchildren to recognize this overriding concern.