EXPERIENCES IN ARAB AFFAIRS

PREFACE

Richard Wilson

Mallinckrodt Research Professor of Physics

Harvard University

In 1989 it was my privilege to invite Fadhel Jamali to spend a week at Harvard University to lecture and discuss whatever he chose. He gave me a typescript of these memoirs which I passed to Widener Library. It was hoped that the typescript would be edited and published to inform the Western World that there was a time when Iraq had tasted and struggled for freedom not only for themselves but also for other Arabs, and by extension for all peoples. Alas, funding for the editing and publication was not forthcoming at that time. Now it is my privilege to arrange for the scanning and placing on the World Wide Web this very important document.

I prepare two versions. Those who wish may see, or download, the whole document in Portable Data Format (pdf). I also have a version in Hypertext Markup Language (html) for convenience in accessing a particular section. I am assisted in this by four young visiting Iraqi scientists who do this in memory of a great Iraqi and a great human being. I note that Fadhel's American wife (Sarah) was a great lady herself. Her humanitarian work on behalf of children firstly in Iraq, and later in Tunis, won the admiration of all who knew her. What other American has been pictured on the front page of a non-American (Tunisian) magazine at age 90, and called the woman of the year? She fully supported Fadhel in his work, and remained in Baghdad when he was in jail during 1958-1961 at great risk to herself.

For 17 years I have had the privilege of calling Fadhel and Sarah my friends. It is for their memory, which I cherish, that I undertake this task.

INTRODUCTION

On the 14th of July 1958, one chapter of Iraq's history was closed by the fall of the Hashemite monarchy. The story of that chapter remains to be written, but some facts are already completely lost to future historians since many documents were destroyed by the 1958 revolution. Besides, the Iraqi government under the royal regime did not care much for publicity, nor did they keep well-documented records. This was especially true of foreign affairs where secrecy was observed. Some secret papers were kept in the private possession of those responsible for handling the affairs, and in certain cases, nothing whatever was put on paper.

As one who took part in Iraqi foreign affairs from 1943 to 1958 I feel it a duty to put on record what I know about Iraq's policy in Arab affairs. During that period I was Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, then Minister of Foreign Affairs in eight Iraqi Cabinets. I presided over the Iraqi Chamber of Deputies for two sessions from 1951-53. I was Prime Minister of Iraq in 1953-54. I attended several of the meetings of the Council of the League of Arab States and the League's Political Committee. I presided over two sessions of the League's Council. In 1945 I attended the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations and signed The Charter on behalf of Iraq. I led the Iraqi delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations at most of its sessions until 1958. I led the Iraqi delegation to the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April 1955. and I also took part in most of the meetings of the Baghdad Pact.

On the morning of July 14, 1958.world news media said that I had been killed by the mobs in Baghdad. Actually some unfortunate fellow was mistaken for me and killed. On the morning of the 17th of July I was arrested in the wilderness north of Baghdad. In the following months I was interrogated. tried an sentenced by the Special High Military Court of Iraq. I was condemned to death. sentenced to fifty-five years of imprisonment. and fined over one hundred thousand dinars (pounds sterling). The death sentence was imposed for my supposed plotting against Syria. Actually I never plotted against Syria nor against any Arab state. I am a Muslim Arab nationalist who believes in the right of the Arabs to be free and to unite by democratic processes. Thanks to the intervention on my behalf of many people. including some great world figures, the death sentence was commuted to ten years of imprisonment: After spending three years in prison I was released on the night of July 14, 1961. For the next nine months I busied myself in collecting and classifying the important documents I happened to have at home. In May 1962 I was permitted to leave Iraq for health reasons. Since 1962, at the invitation of H.E. President Habib Bourguiba, President of the Tunisian Republic. I have been living in Tunis and teaching at its University. In 1970 I started writing my experiences in Arab affairs depending on my memory and on the documents in my possession. The fruits of my effort are by no means perfect or complete, but facts as I experienced them. Some known, others have never been divulged before. Still others have been ignored or distorted by propaganda or prejudice. With all fairness and objectivity one can say that Iraq had a clear and well-designed foreign policy in the period under discussion.

That policy was summarized in a speech which I made as Minister for Foreign Affairs before the Chamber of Deputies on May 5, 1949. There were four guiding principles:

1.. Achieving Iraq's independence and security.

2. Following the principles of the Great Arab Revolution of 1916 which aimed at the liberation and integration of all the Arab world.

3. Promoting good relations with Iraq's neighbours.

4. Using foreign policy as a means for the social and economic development of Iraq along constructive and evolutionary lines and not along revolutionary and subversive lines.

This book deals, mainly, with the second principle, which is the liberation and integration of the Arab world. although the principles above mentioned are really inter-related and the foreign policy of Iraq was, on the whole, coherent and consistent. In arranging the topics dealt with in this book, geographic contiguity was taken as a basis.

Thus we begin with Iraq's relations with the states of the Fertile Crescent: Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Kuwait. Then we deal with Iraq's relations with the Arabian Peninsula: Saudi Arabia and Yemen. This is followed by the Nile Valley: Egypt and Sudan. Then comes Iraq's work for North African independence: Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. After covering Iraq's relations with the individual Arab states we take up Iraq's role in the League of Arab states, in the Baghdad Pact, and in the Asian African Conference at Bandung.

The translation of the Arabic documents into English has been made by the author. The English spelling of Arabic names has also been decided by the author. The spelling has been kept as close to correct Arabic pronunciation as possible. I am indebted to many friends who helped me and encouraged me to write down these memoirs. My gratitude is due to my colleagues and collaborators in the Iraqi government in the past and to the hospitality of the Tunisian government and the Tunisian people in the present day. It is my sincere hope that Iraq will continue to move in the path of brotherhood, freedom and justice for the Arab world and all mankind.

Mohammed Fadhel Jamali

University of Tunis

20th April 1974

IRAQ AND SYRIA

The achievement of pan‑Arab unity is one of the cardinal aims of all Arab nationalists. From the early rise of Arab nationalism, the concept of unity was inculcated in the minds and hearts of Arab nationalists who always aspired to gain the freedom of their peoples from foreign domination and to integrate them into one nation. Some Arab idealists think that all the Arab world could be amalgamated into one centralized state with one head running all. This dream is cherished by many, including the followers of President Gamal Abdul Nasir of Egypt. There are other Arab nationalists who, .like myself, think hat the best form of integration would be reached by the path of confederation, or, at most, of federation. They visualize something like a U.S.A.W., United States of the Arab World. We are of the opinion that, to achieve Arab unity, one should go by stages; integrating areas adjacent to one another and forming one geographic and economic unity. According to this theory, Arab unity could start with three or even four sub‑units. The first would be the Fertile Crescent, consisting of territory extending from the Gulf of Basrah to the Gulf of Aqaba and including Kuwait, Iraq and Greeter Syria which includes Syria, Jordan and Palestine. To my mind this might be a first step in Arab integration.The second unity would consist of the Arab peninsula including Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Southern Arabia, Oman and the Gulf Sheikhdoms. The third would consist of the Nile Valley which is made up of Egypt and Sudan.The fourth would consist of North Africa, including Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.

It is to be understood that the achievement of this unity should come about by an evolutionary process and with the full consent of the peoples concerned. It should be the result of a truly democratic process. There should be no imposition or dictation from any part over the other. Any section of this grouping could stay out if she chose to do so. Lebanon, for example, would be free to remain outside the grouping unless and until its Christian population should deem it to their advantage to join the federation. Syria, before the First World War, was the geographic entity which included present‑day Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans‑Jordan. Beirut in those days was a part of Syria.

When I went to the American University of Beirut, the University had just changed its name from the Syrian Protestant College to the American University of Beirut..Syria was the hot‑bed of Arab nationalism. The Syrians provided the brains for the Arab revolt against the Ottomans. Nationalities in Istanbul before the first World War consisted mostly of Syrians and Iraqis. The majority of those attending the Arab Conference in Damascus, held in 1908 to promote the cause of Arab nationalism, were Syrians. There were also a few Iraqis. During the First World War, Syria offered many nationalist martyrs for the Arab cause who were hung in the large squares of Damascus and Beirut by the order of Jamal pasha, Commander in‑Chief of the ottoman army in that region.

During the First World War, Sharia Husein of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Cairo, exchanged a series of letters in which Britain encouraged the Arabs to rise against the Ottomans for the liberation of the Arab people from Turkish domination. In 1916, under the leadership of Sharif Husain of Mecca and his sons, Abdullah; Faisal and Zaid., the Arabs rose in revolt against the ottoman Empire. Many Arab tribesmen and volunteers were commanded by Iraqi and Syrian army officers who had been trained in the Ottoman army. The first fruit of the Arab Revolt against the Turks in the First World War was the liberation of Syria which was entered by the Arab army, headed by Emir Faisal, the third son of the Sharif of Mecca who had declared the revolt against the Turks: Emir Faisal became the first King of Syria, so Syria had its first Hashemite Arab King after centuries of non‑Arab rule. In March 1920, a Syrio‑Iraqi Conference was held in Damascus, presided over by Hashim al‑Atasi, at which the unity of Syria and Iraq was declared. Behind the backs of the Arabs, two damaging agreements had been made by the 'Allies' of the Arabs. One was the Sykes‑Picot Treaty between France and Britain by which they agreed to partition Syria and Iraq between themselves. This document came to light when the Russian papers were made public by Lenin after the Russian Revolution. As a result of the Sykes‑Picot agreement, the French invaded Syria and the Arab Kingdom headed by King Faisal came to an end, but only after a heroic resistance. The King had to leave Syria, but the Syrians cherish the fondest memories or King Faisal of Syria. The second damaging agreement was the Balfour Declaration in 1917 in which the British Government promised the Zionists a national home in Palestine. Aview with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object..."

Implementing these two plots, the League of Nations put Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate, and Iraq and Trans‑Jordan and Palestine under British Mandate. In 1920 the Iraqis revolted against Great Britain, and Britain found it impossible to rule a turbulent country like Iraq. At the time she wanted to partially correct her stance with the Arabs. Thus she yielded to the wish or the Iraqis and, in 1921, King Faisal, the ex‑King of Syria, came and established the new Kingdom of Iraq.

King Faisal the First championed the ideal or Arab nationalism. When he came to Baghdad he brought with him an Arab nationalist educator, originally from Syria, namely, Sati'al‑Hasri, who became Director‑General of the Ministry of Education. King Faisal was also accompanied by a great Arab nationalist brain, a Sorbonne‑educated Lebanese, Rustam Beg Haidr, who was appointed as Head or the Royal Diwan. These two men, along with the Iraq officers who had fought in the Arab Revolt, like Ja'far al‑'Askeri, Nuri as‑Sa'id, Jamil al‑Madra'i, 'Ali Jawdat, al‑Ayoubi. and others did much to promote the cause of Arab nationalism in Iraq. As a young man I was conscious or all these events. and. from the coming of King Faisal to Iraq. the idea of Arab liberation and Arab unity became one or my great objectives in life. Our whole educational atmosphere in Iraq was filled with inspiration and initiation into Arab nationalism which aimed at the liberation of all Arab lands and their integration The Arab youth were not happy to find that their nation had been cut to pieces and people separated from each other with walls created between one part or the Arab world and another. While there had been no frontiers between Syria and Iraq under the Ottoman Empire. all of a sudden Syrian and Iraqis found themselves separated .from each other by walls. I was one of six Iraqi students sent by the Ministry to study at the American University of Beirut. Our way in these days took from Baghdad to Basrah, to India, to Aden, to Egypt, to Haifa, .to Damascus and then Beirut. Thus I was a University student when I had my first glimpse of Damascus. Over the years I came to love that city of great history which was also a centre of Arab culture and power.

During the Easter vacation. I joined a group of about fifteen students from the American University of Beirut, led by the Instructor of Physical Education, Harry Foot, and went on a visit to Syria. On the way from Beirut to Damascus we stopped at Maysaloun to pay our homage to the souls of those martyrs who were killed there while defending their country against the French invasion. Syria in those days was in revolt against the French, but the cities were calm and orderly for the fighting was done in the countryside. Even in the cities we could see barbed wire at street junctions with French soldiers standing on guard. Travelling from one city to another required a pass from the French officer responsible for the district. I usually acted as the representative of the group in talking to the French officer in order to get the necessary permit. I also acted as an Arabic interpreter for Mr Foot whenever he spoke in the name of the group at a public function. We visited Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. We were entertained very generously by the Syrian people who were friendly to the American University of Beirut, for the University had alumni in all those towns. We also spent a night in a bedouin camp near Aleppo and introduced football to those bedouins for the first time. All of them, young and old, enjoyed kicking the ball and running after it. On our departure we presented them with a football.

On that visit I fell in love with Syria. I felt very much at home there and Syria seemed as much my country as did Iraq. I was filled with pride and admiration for the Syrian people who were fighting for the liberation of their country from foreign domination. That trip invigorated my sense of Arab nationalism, and I felt that an Arab, besides belonging to a province or specific region, belonged to the whole Arab homeland extending from the Gulf of Basrah to the Atlantic Ocean. The partitions and the divisions in Arab world, especially in the Fertile Crescent, were the creation of Western imperialism. It was Western imperialism that divided the united region of Syria into Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. To make it worse, the French subdivided the lesser Syria into separate entities ‑ Damascus, Aleppo, Alawites, Jabal ad‑Druze ‑ each of' which had a separate and different administration. A young Arab nationalist like myself would immediately detest and reject such a state of affairs for his people and nation. Before giving in to the French, the Syrians wrote a golden page in the history of Arab nationalism at Maysaloun, an army post between Beirut and Damascus, where, led by the Minister of Defence, Yusuf al-Azmeh, the small Syrian army fought to the last man against the French. Thus the French could march on Damascus only over the bodies of' the martyrs. Maysaloun, with the graves of the Arab martyrs, including that of Yusuf 'al-Azmeh, represents a point of' pride and inspiration for all Arab youth, and the name of' Yusuf al-Azmeh has become symbolic of Arab readiness to die for the safety of' the homeland. Professor Sati al‑Hasri wrote a classical book in Arabic (now translated into English) commemorating Maysaloun.

In 1932 I returned to Iraq from the U.S.A. after having attained my Doctor of' Philosophy degree in Education from Teachers College, Columbia University, New York. I was appointed as Supervisor General of Education. I remember that, in the Ministry of Education, we engaged hundreds of teachers from Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt who naturally acted as representatives of Arab nationalism. In the summer of 1932 Dr Sami Shawkat, then Director General of Education, and I, as Supervisor General of Education went to Syria and Lebanon to engage teachers. As it happened, the majority of the teachers we engaged were Lebanese. On our way back from Beirut we had luncheon at the Iraqi Consulate in Damascus. Some prominent Syrian nationalists were present. At the luncheon table I was sitting between Dr 'Abdur Rahman Shabandar, a graduate of the American University of Beirut and a well‑known spokesman for Arab nationalism who later was assassinated by French agents, and Ma'arouf Arnawut, a well known author and journalist. During our conversation, Ma'arouf Arnawut asked me, "What has Syria done against you?" I replied, "Nothing at all. On the contrary." "But why, then, do you avoid the employment of Syrian teachers and pick only Maronites from Lebanon?"

I said, "I never differentiated between Syrian and Lebanese candidates, nor‑between Muslims and Christians in choosing teachers. My choice depended solely on academic and professional qualifications." Nevertheless, a telegram was sent from Syria to H.M.King Faisal I complaining that we were biased in the selection of teachers and that we favoured the Lebanese and the Christians. This incident made me think deeply about the cleavage between Syria and Lebanon both from a denominational as well as a political point of' view. It enabled me to appreciate later the Lebanese jealousy for their own independence and their fear of' Syrian encroachment that might result from a Syrio‑Iraqi federation. It shed light on the fear of Lebanese Christians of domination by the Muslims. I come to understand this end I took it into account in all my later activities relating to the Syrio‑Iraqi federation. My attitude towards the Lebanese was that such a federation would surely reduce any denominational bias rather than increase it, and that it would be to the advantage of the Lebanese.

Among the Syrian teachers employed by Iraq were some outspoken Arab nationalists like Dr Farid Zainuddin, Alice Qandaleft and the greet Syrian poet, Badawi al‑Jabel. Some of them became members of the Muthena Club, an Arab nationalist foreign yoke and the achievement of Arab unity. Badawi al‑Jabal composed and recited one of' his historic poems in the Club. A verse from this famous poem runs as follows:

"There is no frontier between Iraq and Sham (Syria). May Allah demolish the frontiers which they erected!"

"They" refers to imperialist powers. The echo of this verse rang in the ears and hearts of all Arab nationalists all the time, and I was no exception. Before his death in 1933. King Faisal I of Iraq was invited to Paris by the French government. He started to convince the French to grant Syria independence in the same way as the British had done to Iraq. The French seemed sympathetic at the time, but the King's untimely death put an end to his plans. To show the importance which the Syrians attached to King F'aisal's effort on their behalf I shall translate a passage from a book in Arabic entitled, AHizb.al‑Istiqlal al‑Jumhoury, which means the Independence Republican Party, by the Lebanese Arab nationalist, 'Adil as‑Sulh.

AAnd the people of Syria from various classes ceme forward signing petitions authorizing King Faisal the First, King of Iraq, to negotiate in Paris regarding the Syrian question. A delegation of Syrian journalists, some nationalist young men, and delegation of Osbat al‑Amal al_Qawmy. The League of Nationalist Action, travelled .to Amman to meet the King on his way to Paris. For the same purpose, the nationalist bloc delegated Saledullah el‑Jebiri as their representative. "

The King told these delegations that he would not let an opportunity pass without his using it to deal with the Syrian question and to strive for its solution. On the 10th or June (1933) in Cairo, King Faisal I received a delegation or the Executive Committee or the Syrian‑Palestinian Conference and a delegation or the Syrian‑Arab Society and some prominent Syrians in Egypt. They jointly presented him with a petition authorizing him to act for them in solving the Syrian problem. While the King was in Amman, the Secretary General of the Arab student conference in Europe, Mukhtar al Mukhish, addressed the following telegram to him:

'The Syrian Arab youth from the various parts of Europe met in the city or Paris to discuss conditions in Syria. They decided to request you to stretch out a helpful hand to them in their efforts, and to make the world hear, during your forthcoming trip to the West about the injustice and persecutions (we suffer). We want complete independence and a true Arab unity."

And Faisal the First, King of Iraq, arrived in Europe and made Geneva his headquarters. He had stated in Amman that he was travelling to Europe in order to try to solve the political problems that concerned the Iraqi Kingdom directly, especially the question or foreign privileges which the British had kept for themselves in Iraq. He said that he would also discuss with some European statesmen the Syrian problem and express his opinion about it. The London Times mentioned that the purpose or King Faisal's passing through Amman was to negotiate on the subject of federating the Arab regions.

The national bloc met in Damascus and delegated two of its leaders, Sa=adulleh al‑Jabiri and 'Afif as‑Sulh, to travel to Amman, contact the King, and discuss with him current Arab affairs in general and the Syrian question in particular. The two delegates had two meetings with the King at which they discussed for severa1 hours the topics that interested the Syrians, and they informed him that the nationalist bloc and the Syrian people were anxious that he should occupy the Syrian throne at the same time as the Iraqi throne. In Paris, Subhi Barakat, President of the Syrian Parliament, who had gone to Paris to discuss the Syrian situation, met with the King and had a lengthy talk with him in which Barakat explained his own stand, and confirmed that King Faisal should be enthroned in Syria in addition, to his Iraqi throne. The King and the President of the Parliament separated with the understanding that they would meet again in Geneva to continue the discussion. One day before the appointed date, Subhi Barakat came to the hotel (in Paris) and informed us of the sudden death of King Faisal in Berne.

This news fell as a thunderbolt on those present, Arab journalists and Arab students. They all rose to go to the Iraqi Legation to offer condolences. This was the 8th of September, 1933. I was aware of all this and it influenced me. In 1936, during the Cabinet of Léon Blum, the Syrian nationalists started negotiations with the French with a view to obtaining independence along the lines of the independence Egypt and Iraq, but they could not. Later on, some of the nationalists had to go underground as the French in Syria began to chase them, Some of the great leaders sought refuge in Iraq. Shukri al-Quwaitli, Saidallah al-Jabiri, Lutri al-Haffar, >Adil Azmeh and others came to Iraq and lived for sometime in Baghdad. This in itself kept the Syrian problems alive and gave greater impetus to the Iraqi government=s work for the freedom of Syria.

During the Second World War, I was transferred from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In my new position I could see to it that the Iraqi government spared no opportunity to convince its allies, Britain and the United States, of the urgent need for the liberation of Syria and Lebanon from the French Mandate. General Sir Edward Spears. for the United Kingdom and Minister George Wadsworth for the United States did their best to promote the independence or these two states. Tahseen Qadri, the Iraqi Consul General and later Minister to Lebanon and Syria, was in constant touch with the political leaders in his area. Iraq worked hard to see to it that, after the downfall of the Vichy regime, the French recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon. The Iraqi government also worked hard to make sure that Syria and Lebanon were invited, in 1945 to the San Francisco Conference for the founding of the United Nations Organization. The French bombardment of Damascus took place at the same time as the opening of the Conference. That gave me an opportunity to go to the rostrum at the General Meeting or the Assembly to denounce the bombardment or Damascus, an: unfortified city and the most ancient one in the world. I asked if the assault was consonant with the French principles or Liberté, Fraternité and Egalité.

I had further opportunity to challenge France in the Committee during the Section in the United Nations Charter dealing with the security Council. I raised the question or whether France was entitled to be named one of the guardians of peace in the world while she was attacking Damascus. I said that her attitude to Damascus should cause her to forfeit her seat as one of the five members of the Security Council. But the real victory for Syria and Lebanon was achieved when Article 78 for the United Nations Charter was adopted. This Article was especially meant to terminate the French Mandate over them. The Article reads as follows:

AThe Trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereignty and equality.@

Since Syria and Lebanon were members of the San Francisco Conference they were considered as founding members of the United Nations, and the Trusteeship system could not be applied to them. The adoption of this Article was a big victory for the Syrian and Lebanese delegations whom Iraq in particular and other Arab and friendly states had whole‑heartedly helped in their campaign. After the San Francisco Conference, the Syrians had to work hard to have the French evacuate Syria. The Syrian nationalist government, headed by Shukri al‑Quwatli as President, achieved the evacuation of the French from Syria by 1946. I was a member or the Iraqi delegation that went to Damascus to attend the celebrations on the occasion of the French evacuation. It was a great occasion and all the Arabs were jubilant. President al‑Quwatli gave a historic speech in which he stated, "There shall be no flag flying over Syria except the Syrian flag and nothing shall be above it except the flag of Arab unity."

President al‑Quwatli's first move was to fly to Saudi Arabia to pay his respects and to express his affection for King 'Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Sa'ud. This was a very strange incident, for the rivalry between the Hashemite and Saudi families was well known. The Regent of Iraq, Prince 'Abdul Ilah was stunned by the Syrian move. Tahseen al Qadri, the Iraqi Minister to Syria and Lebanon was embarrassed.To remedy this embarrassment he arranged that President al‑Quwatli should quickly pay a visit to Iraq. But Prince 'Abdullah was psychologically unprepared for such a visit although he could not turn it down. The Regent did not wish to go to the airport to receive President al‑Quwatli, but, after some persuasion by the Foreign Minister, Arshad wearing a sports shirt instead of formal attire. President Shukri al‑Quwatli and Prime Minister Abddullah al‑Jabiri were somewhat peeved and felt that they had been treated with indignity and lack of courtesy

Premier Sa=Adullah al‑Jabiri asked to meet me behind closed doors. He said that I was the only one to whom he could talk frankly and open his heart. He explained, complaining of the lack of courtesy on the part of the Iraqi authorities. I pleaded for tolerance, big‑heartedness and the overlooking of the trivialities of officialdom and formalities. I said, "Iraq is your home and the Iraqi leaders are your brethren.". The visit certainly muddled rurther the waters it was intended to clear. The Iraqis were really hurt by having been given second place by the Syrians. It was also felt that Tahseen Qadri was wrong to arrange the visit before the Iraqi nerves had cooled down.

From then on. President al‑Quwatli and some of his entourage turned toward Saudi Arabia and Egypt instead of Iraq. It was al‑Quwatli's initial naive mistake and lack of consideration for Iraqi Hashemite sensitivities that led to this coolness in relations. My personal relations with many of the Syrian leaders of those days was always cordial and those who knew me well appreciated my genuine nationalist sentiments. For example, there was always whole‑hearted cooperation between me and Professor Faris al‑Khouri who was leader of the Syrian delagation at the Arab League Conference held at Bludan a mountain resort near Damascus in 1945,. the London Conrerence on Palestine in 1946, and the United Nations General Assembly in 1946 and 1947. Professor al‑Khouri was a wise old gentleman who truly represented political wisdom and acumen. He had an excellent legal mind and was the master or convincing argumentation. I used to cell him abune, Our Father, and we listened carefully to what each other had to say.

An incident of some human interest happened in the winter of 1946 when we were attending the Palestine Conference in London. Professor Faris al‑Khouri ceme one day

Professor al‑Khouri protested, >Fadhel, do you want your father to be treated like a donkey?=

"Far from it. Our Father! Why do you say such a thing?"

"Because, he replied, "Dr Fawzi is a veterinary doctor and you want him to treat me."

We had a good laugh at my expense. I had always thought that Dr Fawzi al‑Mulqi, who had attended the American University of Beirut, was a medical doctor while he was in fact a vetinarian from Edinburgh University.

In 1946 the Arab League met in Cairo. I was the Head of the Iraqi delegation, and it was Iraqi=s turn to preside over the League Council. I was as strict as a teacher in keeping order in the meetings. Sa'adullah al Jabiri, then Prime Minister of Syria, commented once after the meeting, "Fadhel, heve you put us back into school?"

"Yes, Sa'adullah Beg," I said jokingly,"you need it."

This meeting of the Arab League Council was one of the longest ever held. It lasted nearly a month The most crucial issue in that meeting was a complaint to the League Council by the government of Syria against the Kingdom of Jordan. King 'Abdullah had made a call to the people of Syria to join a Greater Syria which would include Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Trans‑Jordan This call was circulated in a printed leaflet and distributed to the Syrian people. The Syrian government considered this a violation of the Arab League Covenant and as interference by one state in the internal affairs of another Arab state. The situation was very tense. The League Council consisted mostly of critics of the Jordanian move. I, as President of the Council, suggested that this Syrian complaint should be referred to a Committee of the Foreign Ministers of all states, members of the Arab League, which would study the matter and bring its recommendations to the Council.

        My suggestion was accepted and that was the birth of the Political Committee of the Arab League.   After that date, several problems were referred to the Political Committee before being presented to the Arab League Council.   In the Political Committee I defended King >Abdullah's declaration as being an expression of a national ideal to be achieved through regular constitutional processes in the future. I argued that it was not meant to be an attack on the ruling government of Syria, since Article 9 of the Arab League Covenant entitles those states who wish to create closer ties to go ahead and do so. The Committee agreed to draft a formula by which Jordan would agree not to interfere in the internal affairs of Syria, but, could at the same time, continue to uphold the ideal of Arab unity.

         After the meeting I made the following declaration on behalf of all the Arab League Foreign Ministers attending the Political Committee:
     "A dispute has arisen about the project of Greater Syria for the sake of which the Foreign Ministers of the Arab states held a special meeting and studied the matter in all its aspects. It appeared that no one intended, by taking up the subject, to interfere with the independence or sovreignty of any of the states of the Arab League or to interfere with the form of government standing therein. Therefore they all affirmed that each of these states upholds the Covenant of the Arab League acting and continuing to act to respect it and to implement it in letter and spirit. Signed:

Foreign Minister of Jordan, Mohammed Shuraiqi
Foreign Minister of Syria, Jamil Mardam Beg
Foreign Minister of Iraq, Mohammed Fadhel Jamali
Acting Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, Yusuf Yaseen
Foreign Minister of Egypt, Ibrahim 'Abdul Hadi
Foreign Minister of Lebanon Philip Taqla
The Delegate of Yemen, AI-Qadhi Mohammed al-‘Amri"

     It seemed that His Majesty, King 'Abdullah, whose ambition for the unity of Greater Syria was always alive, was not pleased with the published statement. Accordingly, I, as President of the Arab League, received the following letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan:

His Excellency, The President of the Council of the League of Arab states,

To confirm the upholding by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan of the Covenant of the League of Arab states, my government has charged me to present the attached memorandum which contains the Jordanian point of view on the matter of unity or federation with Syria. This is a national principle which has no relation to the propaganda against it The understanding between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs should put an end to that propaganda. We are anxious to remove all suspicions and to achieve the full solidarity of the states, Members of the League.

Signed. Mohammed Shuraiqi, The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

The text of the memorandum:

The Jordanian Government considers that any call for national unity or federation through political channels or by legally correct statements without aggression on the rights of others. should not be a cause of disagreement. for the basic principle is that each Arab region must achieve the unity of its parts or their federation when the means of unity and federation are available and when the legal possibilities, which do not do any harm to any private or public right, are made available; for it is for the good of the Arabs to remove divisions which are harmful to national interests and which contradict the welfare of the home land, its hopes and aspirations of the League, or interfere with the government ruling therein, so long as the decision on unity or federation belongs to the will of the people which is concerned and which is the source of all authority, and to the public national conscience and accepted agreements between the responsible governments. With our full appreciation for the efforts of the Committee of the Arab Foreign Ministers to put an end to biased propaganda concerning the project of Greater Syria contained in its common declaration, we present this memorandum to reserve the point of view of the Jordanian government in dealing with a national principle to which it attaches special importance because of its basic connection to its regional interests and national covenant. Please accept the highest respects,

Signed: Mohammed Shuraiqi

Foreign Minister of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

I was also approached by some press men with a question about whether there were any more declarations to be made by any of the responsible leaders concerning the project of Greater Syria. I gave the following answer:

AI do not think so. The Arab nation is faced with several great national problems vis‑a‑vis the outside world, problems which require full dedication of thoughts and efforts to defend Arab lands threatened with danger, especially in Palestine, and to defend our suffering brethren in Libya and North Africa. I hope that the press and men of letters will help direct public opinion in the Arab world to serious efforts to secure the freedom of the Arab lands and to unite their world and come together vis‑a‑vis outside dangers.

One journalist asked if the debate on Greater Syria had done any harm to the mutual relations between states, Members of the Arab League. I answered:

AThe debate was the means of clearing the atmosphere between the Arab states, and it was a proof that the Arab states are all united within the bounds of the League Covenant for which they all cherish respect and loyalty.

The Jordanian Parliament held a special session to debate the issue and to support King 'Abdullah's policy. After lengthy discussion the following declaration was passed:

'14 Muharram. 1366.(8 December. 1946):

1. The Jordanian Legislative Assembly supports completely the principle of the Great Syrian unity and declares its adherence to the Mutual Syrian Pact emanating from the only Constituent Assembly which included representatives from all regions of Syria meeting together in the year 1920 (The General Syrian Conference).

2. The Jordanian Legislative Assembly confirms that the Pact of the great unity of the homeland which was supported at the time by the results of a referendum of the Syrian people in all the regions is also a national principle which is to be unanimously respected, and no one region of Syria has the right to annul it. This principle does not mean transgression on the rights of particular regions or systems of government standing therein since the matter. in its definitions and its executions, has to be supported by the general national will or mutually acceptable agreement entered into by responsible governments.

3. The Jordanian Legislative Assembly protests that His Excellency the Prime Minister of Syria is at the same time the Acting Foreign Minister of Syria, has annulled what was decided by the Committee of the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League Council regarding cooperation between Arab states. It protests, as well, against what some Syrian daily newspapers publish by way of bitter attacks directed against the dignity of this country and causing harm to mutual inter‑Arab relations and national interests.

4. The Assembly refers this Resolution to the government for publication and notification to the parties concerned.

King 'Abdullah never stopped his campaign for the unity of Greater Syria. He continued making declarations and. publishing leaflets addressed to the Syrian people. Take as an example the one that was published in Amman and dated 16 Holy Ramsdhan,1366, (4 August, 1947). It was entitled, A Royal Statement: The Great Syria State and Arab Union. Here is a translation of the last two sections of that statement:

'Dear People:

What we call for is not mere words. On the contrary, it is a desired hope and a forthcoming truth. National conscience is grieved that some say that the Covenant of the Arab League required the preservation of the status quo in Arab lands which means paralyzing the movement for Arab development by preserving the partitions which foreign imperialism imposed, not for the interests of Syria as a whole, nor for the interests of the Arabs in general.

It is such statements which are a departure from the League Covenant and a shattering of its highest goals. This certainly motivates us to openly state with no hesitation or obfuscation that the principles of the liberating Arab revolution, emanating from national conscience and written with Arab tears and blood. these principles are still and will continue to be the guiding goal of the aspirations of all the Arabs. Believing that Syria is still cut to pieces physically and humanly, they shall not tolerate this tearing apart and closing the road towards unity. They shall assert the consciousness of their right. and they shall double, in God, their efforts.

Dear People:

To be vocal in expressing national rights is the right thing in every time and place, and it is this openness that the regions of Syria or their official governments should call to a national preparatory conference to decide the following matters:

1. To set a plan for Syrian unity or federation objectively, within the bounds of international covenants, national hopes and common regional interests.

2. To consider the union or the federation of Syria as a problem which concerns the Syrian states and the will of the Syrian people alone within the bounds of the whole homeland, geographically. historically and nationally.

3. To set up provisions guaranteeing that the unity or the federation shall refuse any diminution of national rights to independence acquired internationally within the bounds of the Charter of the United Nations.

4. To define the position of Palestine in relation to unity or federation in a manner which puts a stop to Zionist danger finally and completely.

5. To invite the governments of the regions of the Syrian homeland to a common agreement which ends with calling a general meeting (constituent assembly) which will include representatives of all the Syrian regions to set up a constitution of the state on the basis of unity or federation in the light of the agreed plan.

6. To call, as soon as the Greater Syrian state is formed, for the already sanctioned Arab federation of the Fertile Crescent, Syria and Iraq, which would implement the plans laid down according to the principles of the liberating Arab revolution and required by the Pact of the 8^th of March, moving on the path opened by the Covenant of the Arab League. This is what we call for and this is what we work to realize, desiring nothing for this but the countenance of God's bounty and the great future of the Arabs. This is the clear truth "and you will hear its news eventually".

King 'Abdullah's words were highly poetic and literary with rhyme and rhythms. It is a pity that no translation into English can reproduce the literary quality. The squabble between Syria and Jordan continued. The Syrian government, while being vociferous about Arab unity, were proud of their independence and took a negative attitude toward any approach by Iraq or Jordan f'or any kind of' union or special arrangement outside the Arab League. In 1946, Nuri as‑Sa'id had proposed to both Syria and Lebanon that special treaty relationships should be established between Iraq and those two countries covering economics, communications, irrigation, judicial, cultural and other matters. The Syrian government, with al‑Quwatli as President of' the Republic and Sa=dullah al‑Jabiri as Prime Minister, turned down Nuri's proposals. Nuri then went to Turkey end reached agreement with the Turkish government on those proposed items. It was Sa=dullah=s opinion that Syria should take no step outside the Arab League. The Arab League, however, with its divided policies end divergent points of' view and the varied mentality of' its members could hardly take any step forward in any major question related to Arab affairs with the exception of Palestine and the liberation of' the North African states.

I visited Sa=dullah al‑Jabiri before his death in the Omayyid Hotel in Damascus, where he was lying ill. Sa=adullah, who confided in me and considered me a true friend, expressed to me his deep regret for having turned down Nuri's proposals, and his disillusionment with the great hopes he had had in the Arab League. He told me, "Fadhel, I regret very much not having gone along with Iraq. I am greatly disappointed in the achievements of' the Arab League."

I visited Syria again after the Palestine tragedy. In my memorandum I made the following notes which describe the atmosphere prevailing in Syria at the time.

Palestine.
1. All those whom I met in Syria considered it necessary to unify efforts and to harmonize plans for Palestine. President Shukri a1‑Quwatli said that Syria adopts the Resolution passed by the Parliament of Iraq on Palestine (See pp. for that Resolution)

2. They all wanted a complete understanding with Great Britain on the solution of the Palestine problem and they all wanted Britain to appreciate the Communist‑Zionist danger.

3. They wanted a meeting of the Arab states to reach an agreement on a unified policy vis‑a‑vis the United Nations Conciliation Commission on Palestine.

4. They were very much concerned that there should be a clear atmosphere between Egypt and Iraq. The President of the Republic deputized Lutff al-Haffar to Egypt with a personal message to this effect.

5. Nabih al‑'Almeh regretted that the Arab states did not fight and did not sacrifice for Palestine. The President of the Republic hoped that at least one successful military move would be attained.

The Arab League. The Syrian government is strongly is strongly attached to the principles of the Arab league and calls for reorganizing and reinforcing the League. Syrio‑Iraqi Federation. I found a strong inclination in non‑governmental circles for the federation of Syria and Iraq. Nabih al‑'Azmeh, President of the Nationalist Party, and 'Adnan al‑Atasi, for the Peoples Party, both expressed this desire. Atasi even informed me that his Party had submitted an official memorandum to the President of the Republic in which they asked for the federation of Iraq and Syria, but they are anxious about two points, first, the in fluence of H.M. King 'Abdullah on Iraqi politics, and second, the Anglo‑Iraqi Treaty.

I answered that, although Iraq was allied with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, it was independent in its policies. As for the 1930 Treaty with Britain, the disposal of it had already been agreed in principle, and nothing would remain but our Alliance with Britain in facing an external aggression and that was what Syria wanted, too. They agreed. As for government circles, they think that union should take the form of treaties and agreements between two separate, independent states (as is the case between Iraq and Turkey) in matters affecting defence, communication, education, legislation, customs, navigation, etc., with special emphasis on unifying plans for defence. That is what the Prime Minister of Syria, Khalid al‑'Azm, emphasized to me, and that is what he wished to achieve as quickly as possible.

I referred to the scheme of Nuri as-Sa=id along those very lines, which was rejected by the late Sa=adullah al‑Jabiri who said that such schemes should come through the Arab League. I spoke at length explaining the futility of waiting for everything to be decided by the League. Article 9 of the Covenant of the Arab League is clear. It encourages the strengthening of relations between Arab states wishing to do so beyond the limits of the League. Taha Pasha al‑Hashimi spoke to me about the urgency and necessity of the federation between Iraq and Syria because of Syria's need for Iraqi aid in defending its borders, for Syria was exposed to direct Zionist danger, and, if Syria went, there would be no direct connection between Iraq and the Arab world.

Syria and H.M. King' Abdullah.

There was a prevailing fear of H.M.King Abdullah, and various things were attributed to him by partisan people. One exception to this was Faris al‑al-Khouri whom I found appreciative of King 'Abdullah's idea about Greater Syria. He thought that the King should be trusted in the saving of Palestine, but he dared not make his views public nor did he wish to be quoted. He attacked the policy of isolation from the Greet Powers which was prevailing in some Arab states and he called for complete understanding with Britain. He criticized H.M. King 'Abdul 'Aziz Ibn Sa'ud for refusing even to threaten to cut the flow of oil.

Haji Ameen al‑Husaini. In Egypt, Lebanon and Syria, I found harsh criticism directed against the policies of Haji Ameen al‑Husaini. Among those who were critical were Jamal al‑Husaini and Faris al‑Khouri.

Conclusions.

Everywhere I found criticism of Iraq for not having gone to the help of Egypt. I also found that many have great hopes in Iraq and its new government. They think that the Iraqi government has the cards in its hand and that it can now render the greatest service to Palestine if they are well played When that coup happened I was Foreign Minister in Nuri's Cabinet. The coup came as a big shock and surprise to us. We had no premonition or it at all.We were greatly concerned at the time about the safety of President Shukri al‑Quwatli and his colleagues. Upon being reassured about that, Nuri suggested that we should send Jamal Baban, a Senator and former Iraqi Cabinet Minister who was a Kurd, to Syria to meet as‑Za'im, who himself was a Kurd, and come to an understanding with him on the need for cooperation and unity between Syria and Iraq. Jamal Baban left Baghdad on the 2nd of April and he sent us the following telegram:.

Please present my respects to His Royal Highness the Regent and to His Excellency Nuri as-Sa=id, wishing that they may know thst I have not undertaken this move because of any outside influence. The army undertook the move as a result of public and army discontent resulting from the behaviour of the President of the Republic and his government in permitting carriers of subversive doctrines and severe attacks by Members of Parliament against the army. The public are very much relieved because of this coup.

When I started to question him about other subjects, especially Arab and foreign affairs he answered me very clearly after requesting me to keep confidential that he intended first of all to unite Syria with Iraq militarily and economically as a first step to larger union, so that we may be able to stand against outside aggression, for it is impossible for the Arabs to survive as small states. He gave as an example the tragedy of Palestine. But at the present it is not possible to open this door because the President of the Republic and previous governments have unjustifiably created resentment against TransJordan and they threw themselves into the lap of the Saudi and Egyptian Kingdoms fruitlessly. I asked him, "When can we start with this?" He answered that he is busy now forming the government and he may be obliged to dissolve the House or Representatives and start elections immediately to form a constituent assembly that will revise the Constitution and this will take no less than a month. After that he will send a delegation to Iraq to negotiate this problem. He does not wish the Egyptian or Saudi governments to hear this. They both have received his movement with resentment at a time when he needs support and quiet. When I asked him on what basis he intended to revise the Constitution and whether the system of government was going to be republican or royal he excused himself for not answering, saying, "You will hear about that in due time, but first I will not permit the election of any representative who opposes my principles".

When we moved to foreign policy he told me that he had met the British and American Ministers and notified them about his readiness to sign bilateral treaties with them on the basis of cooperation and participation in the Marshall Plan. Expanding on this subject he said: I wish you to notify His Royal Highness and the Prime Minister that I am preparing myself from now to annex to Syria the part of Lebanon inhabited by Muslims, when Syrian unity is complete. When I advised him that he should cooperate with the legal men of Syria he answered me that Faris al‑Khouri does not wish to cooperate with us and that he (Za'im) was in touch now with 'Adil Aralan to have him join the Cabinet.

I asked him if he had any objection to my meeting Faris al‑Khouri and 'Adil Aralan. He agreed to that but asked me not to say a word to them about the conversation between us. My meeting with him lasted about two hours. When I came out I went immediately to see Faris al‑Khuri whom I found in bed. I informed him about my meeting with Za'im, not mentioning the important points which I had been asked not to divulge and I handed him the letter of His Excellency the Prime Minister. He answered me that he had reached old age and he did not permit himself to take part from now on in any government the consequences of which were not known. He informed me that Za'im had met him twice and that he had done his best to help him ease the situation and quiet conditions and that was by asking Shukri al-Quwatli to resign, but Shukri refused emphatically saying that he would not resign so long as he had a beating pulse. It is to be understood that the majority of the people are very much relieved by the removal of Quwatli from his government post and conditions are quiet as if nothing had happened. When I informed Faris al‑Khouri that the Iraqi government welcomed his undertaking the responsibility of forming the Cabinet in order to save the situation, being sure of his good intentions toward Iraq he answered: I know that, and I know that His Royal Highness the Regent supports me also, but I regret to inform you that the matter has become an impossibility so far as I am concerned. I have not been able to meet 'Adil Aralan for he had an appointment with as‑Za'im for that day and he was still with him Al‑Za'im intends to dissolve all parties and organizations as he declared to me. My personal conclusions are that, although as‑Za'im is negotiating with 'Adil Aralan and Faris al‑Khouri to form a Cabinet I understand from meeting with him that he does not wish to form any government until after the elections and then he will form a new government from individuals who win his confidence, or he may head the Cabinet himself and retain the Ministries of Interior end Defence and he may make 'Adil Aralan and others participate with him.

I met the President of The Peoples Party in Orient Palace (hotel) and I could get no ideas from him because people are afraid. I shall meet some newspaper men today with complete reserve in order to find out prevailing opinions. Tomorrow morning I am leaving for Beirut to meet the responsible people there and to get their point of view. On returning I shall dine with As‑Za'im because he has invited me to resume discussions on a larger scale. As‑Ze'im requested me"not to reveal anything and I request you to instruct the press and the Iraqi radio to support him as much as possible. I expect your instructions to guide me in my resumption of negotiations with as‑Za'im. I ask you to telegraph to Beirut where I expect to stay three days.

IRAQIA

After three days the following telegram arrived from Jamal Baban.

Foreign Affairs, Baghdad. Damascus 5/4/49.

The following to His Excellency the Prime Minister and copy to the Head of the Royal Diwan.

I left for Damascus immediately after receiving your telegram. I contacted various strata of the people. They were all happy with the coup at first.

The behaviour of as‑Za=im indicating the establishment of a dictatorship in the country, his dissolution of the Parliament, and his continued arresting of people without forming a Cabinet has caused a great reaction. His monopoly of authority has caused discontent amongst the army officers. They all seek the help of Iraq to federate the two states provided that Trans‑Jordan shall not interfere. The people here are not expected to realize this aim at the present without the support of Iraq. Taha Hashimi called on me and confirmed this point of view and requested that the opportunity should not be lost. Myself and our Minister had luncheon with as‑Za'im alone. We dealt with all the topics. I assured him about Iraq's readiness to help him. I shall present the details upon my return. The opportunity is available from all points of view to think of the subject seriously. Aralan is hesitant to take part in spite of my insistence in your name that he should do so. He is shortly leaving with al‑Khouri for the United States.It is necessary that I should stay here until Thursday morning. Please prepare a plane.

Jamal Baban

From these telegrams I came to two basic conclusions. The first was that we should capitalize on the opportunity offered by the coup d'état to achieve Syrio‑Iraqi rapprochement. The second was that Husni as‑Za'im seemed to be lacking balance and therefore reliability. The Prime Minister, Nuri as‑Sa'id, decided to send another official, Awni Al‑Khalidi, with a personal letter from the Prime Minister to Faris Bey al‑Khouri in whose judgment we had confidence. Awni ai‑Khalidiarrived in Damascus on the 12^th of April and went immediately to see Faris al‑Khouri with whom he had a full discussion about the existing situation.

In his written report dated April 14, 1949, Awni al‑Khalidi summarized Faris Bey's views as follows:

His Excellency believes that there is no crisis in Syria now. The military coup has settled down internally and the people gladly accepted it. That is why there is no need for any external mediation now. On the other hand, members of the Parliament or political parties cannot in the present circumstances stances put anything on paper in spite of the fact that some of them have some ideas and wishes. As-Zai'im dissolved the Parliament and the member showed no resistance to that dissolution, and, after the resignation of the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister the situation became legal. There is no House of Representatives since az‑Za'im himself has taken the legislative and executive authority into his own hands.

His Excellency 'al‑Khouri accepts the federation of Syria and Iraq under one crown and believes that the best method to achieve that would be through a military agreement or alliance which would gradually develop into a complete unity between the two states. That is because it is difficult for azsZa'im to face the Republic with the federation at once, it being understood that the people, the army and the political parties are all ready and desirous to achieve unity.

His Excellency had met as‑Za'im a few days before and tried to induce him to hasten an understanding with Iraq on the basis of unity. As‑Za'im expressed his desire for that and called the Iraqi Minister to Damascus with the purpose of initiating a military agreement. Faris al‑Khouri believes in the necessity of hastening this action before anything internal happens which might divide the word of the people, especially that now they are all unanimous in accepting mutual understanding and rapprochement of this kind with Iraq.

His Excellency still continues to refuse his cooperation with the coup movement, but, at the present time he does not oppose it, but sees the necessity of its continuing, of directing it and of helping it. He told me that he intends to leave for America after something like two weeks to resume his work in the United Nations. Having found out that as‑Za'im was interested in a military agreement with Iraq I was very enthusiastic that Iraq should go ahead and enter such an agreement. Prime Minister Nuri as‑Sa=id, however, was more cautious. He decided to go to Damascus and meet as-Zai'im personally. On the morning or the 16th or April, Nuri Pasha as‑Sa=id, dressed in the attire or a high‑ranking General, with all his military decorations, which put him on a much higher rooting than as‑Za'im, boarded a military plane accompanied by Shakir al‑Wadi, the Minister of Defence, General Saleh Saib, Chief of the Iraqi General Staff, Brigadier 'Abdul Muttalib al‑Ameen, Senator Jamel Baban and 'Awni al‑Khalidi. They landed in Damascus where they were joined by our Minister to Syria, Ibhrahim >Akif al-Alousi. Nuri Pasha told me that he first had a private meeting with as‑Za'im in which he discovered as‑Za'im's utter futility. It seems to me that Nuri must have scared as‑Za'im and given him a shock based on an inferiority complex.

After the private meeting, there was an official meeting of the Iraqi delegation headed by Nuri Pasha with a Syrian delegation headed by as‑Za'im Husni as‑Za'im. The following is the text of the minutes of that meeting:

Very confidential.

Minutes of the meeting between the Heads of the two governments of Iraq and Syria held in Damascus, the day of 16/4/1949.
At 1 o'clock on the day of 16 April, 1949, the Heads of the two Governments of Iraq and Syria met in the Palace of the Presidency of the Republic in Damascus. The Iraqi delegation was headed by His Excellency General Nuri Pasha as‑Sa'id. His Excellency was accompanied by the following Iraqis: Their Excellencies, Shakir Pasha al‑Wadi, the Minister of Defence, Jamal Beg Baban, Brahim 'Aqif Beg al Alousi, Minister Plenipotentiary in Damascus, General Saleh Saib Pasha, Chief of the General Staff of the Army, Brigadier 'Abdul Muttali`al‑Ameen,Sayed 'Awni al‑Khalidi. There were, on the Syrian side, His Excellency Az‑Za'im Husni az‑Za'im, Head of the Delegation, Emir Adil Aralan, His Excellency Faidhi Al‑Atasi, Brigadier 'Abdullah Lutfi.His Excellency the Prime Minister (of Iraq) opened the discussion by saying: Your Excellency, Mr President, I am very happy for the opportunity of meeting our brethren, the men of Syria and exchanging views with them and getting acquainted with the steps which our sister Syria has taken, for the concern of Iraq with his sister is among the primary matters which never leave our thoughts. We follow the news of dear Syria in full and we wish her all success and prosperity. We are happy to see our sister moving steadily towards stability. It has quickly formed a responsible Cabinet and is returning to normal conditions which will give reassurance to all of us. In this connection Syria does not need new recognition of its present political status from other states, for Syria is an independent country and what happened is something which is the concern of its own people. It is they who accept a certain rule and this situation does not require recognition for no state can whittle down the right of Syria to the independence and sovereignty which she now enjoys.

Two weeks ago we heard movement of the Jews in Palestine who were intending to exploit the events in Syria, a matter which made us anxious in Baghdad and aroused all our concern. After that we received a telegram from Damascus requesting Iraqis military aid. That is why we thought of sending a military mission to understand the Syrian point of view and the nature and extent of the military aid required from Iraq against the Jewish aggression. That is why I came myself with the Minister of Defence and the Chief of the General Staff to avoid delays in communications and to assure you here that the Iraqi government will undertake to offer all necessary help in case of any aggression falling on the Syrian army. We do not consider this matter as a problem foreign to us. And we would be ready to render this help whether the Syrians asked us to do so or not, for we consider Jewish aggression on the Syrian army to be the same as an aggression on the Iraqi army. That is why we must come and help. If the intention, however, has a broader meaning of military cooperation, like mutual defence, for example, we should like to know whet your tendencies are on this subject, especially since the last Syrian delegation which came to Baghdad carried a long list of military material related to its needs. As is well known, Iraq is bound by a Treaty Alliance with Great Britain, and, although only a rew years remain till this treaty expires, we are still bound by its terms and articles. That is why, if we enter into a mutual defence agreement with Syria, we have to consult Britain in that respect, although I may say that the world is changing rapidly, and it is moving now with fast steps and it will shortly be possible to sign a pact which is larger than the alliance of two countries, a pact which may include all or most of the states of the Middle East and that pact will include matters of defence and all Arab states could join it. In such conditions the pact will guarantee the conditions required for mutual defence against aggression. I hope this will happen very shortly. The question of cooperation between Syria and Iraq has been occupying my mind for some time. I did what I could do in this respect in 1946 when I tried, with the late Sa'adullah al‑Jabiri, Prime Minister at that time, to unify communications, customs, economic and trade matters and irrigation. The late Jabiri agreed to this in principle, he and President Shukri al‑Quwatli, but they thought that undertaking such steps might arouse the suspicions of' Egypt and Saudi Arabia and said that it would require preparing the atmosphere.

Four years have passed and the atmosphere has not been prepared. I must say that, in our desire to achieve cooperation between the two regions we did not forget Lebanon, for I spoke with Sami as-Sulh Prime Minister of Lebanon at that time, on the subject. The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved these suggestions, but I did not wish to take such steps with Lebanon without Syria. I told Sami as-Sulh that he should convince our Syrian brethren to go along with us together. Then we would achieve what we had agreed on. I am afraid that if Iraq were to come forward with a proposal or an opinion it might be accused of not having the genuine intention and sincere wish which we carry. That is why it may be good to wait now for a time with regard to taking any actual steps toward unity. We will wait also until our sister finds that opportunity is at hand and request us to fulfill or study one of' these projects in this respect. Then we shall look into every proposal of this kind with all concern and study it fully. But the problem of mutual defence against the Zionists now is a matter which is an obvious one. As for other problems it may be best to postpone them now.

His Excellency as‑Zai'im:

I welcome you very graciously and thenk you very much for the nice words which you were kind enough to utter. Syria and Iraq are not only two neighbours; they are more than that, and I believe that we must cooperate to the utmost in matters or frontiers, matters of customs, military matters and others. I am not familiar with the earlier proposals of Your Excellency. If they are in the Ministry or Foreign affairs in Damascus we shall study them fully, otherwise we shall request you to provide us with a copy thereof so that we may study them. The Jews have now stopped attacking Syrian positions and we have come not to fear them. I shall not hide from you that we are growing in strength. Some arms have arrived for us end more will arrive. These arms consist of tommy‑guns, cannons and armoured cars. Any Jewish aggression, therefore, will be costly for them. The only thing which we may need is the air weapons, end, probably in time of need, Iraq can help us with air force.

With regard to our policy now, our policy towards you should be a policy of friendship and brotherhood, and His Excellency Emir >Adil is studying all these problems now. Among the projects we should undertake is the establishment of a railroad from Homs to Palmyra and Deir ez-Zor. This is of military importance, not only for the defence of Syria and Iraq, but also for the possibility or Turkey taking part in a project of defending this region. We must also cooperate in combatting Communism.

After the Prime Minister's return to Iraq, the following statement was given to the press by the Iraqi Information Department:

The Iraqi government has for some time been watching with concern the process of truce negotiations between the Zionists and the Syrian government, and, since the Iraqi government is quite anxious that the Zionists should not exploit the Syrian coup and follow a hard line in negotiations or become aggressive on the Syrian borders, the Iraqi government felt that it was its duty to assure our Syrian brethren that Iraq is ready to come with all its force to the support of Syria if any Zionist aggression takes place on Syrian borders. For this purpose His Excellency the Prime Minister himself left yesterday for Damascus by plane accompanied by His Excellency the Minister of Defence) and the Chief of the General Staff of the Army to assure the Syrian government that Iraq would consider any Zionist aggression on the borders of Syria as aggression on Iraq itself, and that the Iraqi army would be ready at all times to respond to the call of brotherhood. His Excellency the Prime Minister and his company returned to the capital today.

Nuri's trip to Damascus bore no fruit. It immediately aroused King Farouq of Egypt, Azzam Pasha. the Secretary General of the Arab League, who was at that time the standard‑bearer of King Farouq and King 'Abdul 'Aziz of Saudi Arabia, rushed from Cairo to meet Husni as‑Za'im. I do not doubt at all that he did his best to turn him away from Iraq. Besides, through Netheer Fansa, brother in‑law of as‑Za'im, King Farouq could influence as‑Za'im. King Farouq invited as‑Za'im to Cairo where he was entertained lavishly with pomp, gifts and decorations. As‑Za'im began to suffer from megalomania. He ordered a golden baton from France and enjoyed the pomp and vanities of office.

On one occasion as‑Za'im sent Emir >Adil Aralan and Dr Farid Zeinuddin, to Baghdad. On talking with them I discovered that as‑Za'im was hopeless. He could not be relied upon. Some months passed and conditions in Syria began to slip from nationalist hands. On a visit to Lebanon I had a talk with Prime Minister Riyadh as‑Sulh which included a review of the situation in Syria I made the following record:

Riyadh Beg emphasized what he had already previously explained in Iraq, that the situation in Syria was not normal and not stable. People are dispersing from around Husni az‑Za'im from day to day, and it seems that the army officers and the soldiers are not pleased with the government of as‑Za'im or with his coup d'état, but, naturally they will not oppose his rule with force unless something induces them to do so. As for the men of politics in general those who supported the previous regime, or those who opposed as‑Za'im, not to speak of helping him or cooperating with him. Very few exceptions could be made to this statement, and the only important man who is cooperating with him is Emir 'Adil Aralan. As for the public it has waked up from the blow, for, when the public supported the coup at f'irst, it thought that the coup would lead to union with Iraq, but, when it appeared that it meant replacing Shukri al-Quwaitly by as‑Za'im, that did not please them. But none of' them dare oppose as‑Za'im for he has the power in his hands. But they can do much if Iraq goes forward with a quick positive action before they get involved, because of fear or benefit, in cooperation with as‑Za'im.

The Iraqi authorities had asked for petitions from some Syrian personalities or that some of' those personalities should come to Iraq asking for Iraq's help so that Iraq might have justification for interfering in Syria. Although some of' the personalities are ready to make petitions or come to Iraq, they feel that Iraq does not need such a move on their part before intervening in the affairs of Syria. On the other hand, they are afraid lest as‑Za'im, if Iraq does not intervene immediately, may deal a crushing blow to them and their relatives. That is why, if they are to come to Iraq, their stay must be very short.

Then I concluded my report: Most of' the Syrian nationalists, and they are the elite and the leaders of public opinion in Syria and Lebanon, support Riyadh Beg=s view and they deem it necessary that the Iraqi government should make a decisive move to realize union with Syria, and they think this could be achieved in one of two ways. The first is a quick one which would involve the Iraqi army's entering Syria and a guarantee that the Syrians would rise in support of the Iraqi army and that the Syrian army would show no resistance. I'he second is a slow method, namely, by providing a strong propaganda campaign centered in Damascus and Beirut, enlisting the Lebanese press, and making contacts with the tribes, the army and the political leaders or Syria, and by providing them with arms. It is advised that this should be done quickly before Za'im is elected as President or the Republic. I must say that the Iraqi government did not act in accordance with this advice. The truth or the matter is that Prime Minister Nuri as‑Sa'id did not believe in Syrio‑Iraqi federation although much later he came to see the situation differently.

With all this going on, King 'Abdullah of Jordan was greatly enraged at Iraqi interference with Syria. He sent the Prime Minister or Jordan, Tawfiq Pasha Abul Huda, to Baghdad to express his great concern and worry about Iraq's interference in Syria which His Majesty looked upon as his own domain. Tawfiq Pasha told me that His Majesty was enraged to the extent of thinking of marching on Iraq (sic) if Iraq did not refrain from interfering with Syria. I, as Minister of Foreign Affairs or Iraq, gave Tawfiq Pasha the true picture of the whole situation and told him to pay my respects to His Majesty and to assure him that Iraq would always be glad if His Majesty could achieve the unity of Syria and Jordan. If, however, that could not happen at present, would His Majesty prefer that Syria should be estranged from both Iraq and Jordan? Would not His Majesty prefer that Syria and Iraq should be closer together until an eventual unity of all three?

I said that I put myself at His Majesty's disposal for any policy which he might put forward on the subject, our aim and national objective being one and the same. Tawfiq Pasha returned and conveyed my views to His Majesty and telephoned back saying, "His Majesty kisses your cheeks and has full confidence in your stand. Pursue your policy."

While in Baghdad Tawfiq Pasha explained to me Jordan's policy of unifying the two sides of the Jordan river by referendum on the West Bank and by providing access to the sea. Of course the port of Aqaba was to be developed. Egypt was opposed to unity of the two sides of the Jordan. Tawfiq Pasha also told me that Jordan could not recognize Husni az‑Za'im until the constitutional problem had been settled. As for those Arab: governments who recognized as‑Za'im, they did so for self‑interest and with disregard for principles. He spoke about the interference in Syria of >Assam Pasha, the Secretary General of the Arab League, and about the question raised by Ibrahim Pasha 'Abdul Hadi, Prime Minister of Egypt, about Greater Syria and whether King 'Abdullah was still pursuing that policy. Abul Huda thought that the situation in Syria was very unstable because the Syrians, although they thought at first that as‑Za'im came as a saviour, soon discovered that he was a dictator. He himself told an Egyptian journalist, "I am a dictator." They discovered that Shukri al‑Quwatli was far better and more honourable. Besides, as‑Za'im did not stand for the Cause of Arab nationalism.

In a talk with Abul Huda, Nuri Pasha said that our approach to Syria would be one of military alliance. He outlined the difficulties of recognition as well as the difficulties of interference. Any interference in the affairs of Syria, according to Nuri Pasha, might arouse the Zionists, the Turks, Egypt, Ibn Sa'ud, and, in the case of conflict, it would be the powerful who would gain, namely, the Zionists and the French. That is why Nuri thought that the Syrians should be left to their own devices and that no incident should be brought about which might be exploited. He said, "We will not interfere unless we are asked to do so in case of trouble inside Syria. We should let the Syrians express their own wish freely if they want any association with the Hashemites. We will not work against Sidi 'Abdullah (H.M. King Abdullah) nor carryon propaganda against him in Syria. Neither will we take any important step before informing Sidi 'Abdullah. I shall quote here a section from a confidential report made by s trustworthy correspondent of Al Ahram, the well-known Egyptian newspaper, and given to the Iraqi Charge d'Affaires in Damascus. The report reveals a good deal about the intricacies of power politics in Syria and the Middle East at the time.

2/8/1949. Terrorism prevails in Syria and men of the former regime crowd the prisons and detention centres. As-Za'im invents ways of torturing and abusing these people. That is why the public is fed up with his eccentricities and irresponsible behaviour. The following facts are submitted with caution for information only.

1) It is now decisively proven that France completely dominates Syrian economy and that the French Minister Plenipotentiary and the Director of the National Bank of Syria‑Lebanon, who is French, are the two who conduct the economic and financial policy there. They have succeeded in stopping the weaving factories in Aleppo and Damascus so that their manufactured goods shall not compete with French imports. The owners of these factories suffer from an acute financial crisis. They try to get loans from the Bank of Syria‑Lebanon without success. Many, including al‑Hariri, the ex‑Minister of Finance, who is a well- known wealthy Aleppo man, are threatened with bankruptcy.

2) Husni az‑Za'im provided facilities for the Syrian-Lebanese Bank to dominate farmers and landowners by passing a law authorizing the Syrian‑Lebanese Bank alone to give loans to farmers and landowners by passing authorizing the Syrian-Lebanese Bank alone to give loans to farmers and landowners with interest up to30%, and giving them the right to mortgage all the land and property of the debtors until the loan is repaid in full.

2) . All those who cooperated with the French Mandate were returned to their posts and a word from the French Minister or any member of the French Legation is not turned down in any government department.

4). The French offered Husni as‑Za=im seven cargo ships laden with arms, and the Bank of Syria‑Lebanon pays him great sums every month for the services he renders to France and to France and to French entrepeneurs. He intends to restore the system of advisors by calling them experts.

5). The French cooperate with the Americans and the Sa'udis to keep British influence out of' Syria. The Americans tolerate the extension of French influence now, for their aim is to strengthen the second line behind the Turkish front, and this is the reason behind the rapprochement between as‑Za'im and the Turks.

Signed, Chargé d=Affaires of Iraq

Relations between Syria and Iraq were deteriorating and the situation in Syria was going from bad to worse, day by day. I quote the following from an authoritative report:

1). Husni az‑Za'im told some press men that he is obliged to fight on four fronts, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel... He asked them to attack the person of His Royal Highness the Regent of Iraq.

2. He calls merchants one at a time and imposes on them a certain levy in the name of the Army Tax which should be paid immediately otherwise they will be sentto AI‑Mezza prison or to Tedmur (Palmyra) where they will be tortured and degraded.

3. Munir ar‑Rais, the well‑known Syrian journalist, privately revealed that az‑Za'im had asked him to carry on a strong campaign against Iraq and informed him that a million Syrian pounds had been allotted for propaganda and information in Iraq.
4. Hashim‑Atasi tried to go to France to visit his son but was prevented from doing so. He thinks that he and his like should go to Egypt and Saudi Arabia to call their attention to the harm done by their helping az‑Za'im. He speaks of torture in prisons and extortion of money and the discontent that has started in the ranks of the army.
5. Muhsin al‑Barazi said that he came into the government to check the excesses in the actions of as‑Za'im. The truth is that they were both in agreement before the coup. This is the unanimous view of the politicians.
6. The French influence is growing from day to day, end Barazi says that as‑Za'im is pushed into that whenever he feels threatened by the Hashemites.

7. Some members of the Nationalist party are showing some cooperation with as‑Za=im in order to spite the People's Party who have become his enemy no. 1 after they had been the closest to him. The truth is that all nationalists, parties end politicians of various views are anti‑Za=im, even though they may appear otherwise, since they are all afraid of torture, degradation and imprisonment.

8. Muhsin al‑Barazi is the one who feeds the Egyptian papers with the help of Saudi money.

9. Riyadh as‑Sulh asked his friends, whether politicians or newspaper men, to denounce the campaign against Iraq and some newspaper men stated that they did not know the facts about Syria and that Iraq did not contact them to come to an understanding.