The Natione | posted April 27, 2006 (May 15, 2006 issue)
Ferment Over 'The Israel Lobby'
Philip Weiss
Intellectuals can only dream of having the impact that John Mearsheimer
and Stephen Walt have
had this spring. Within hours of their publishing a critique of the
Israel lobby in The London
Review of Books for March 23, the article was zinging around the world,
soon to show up on the
front pages of newspapers and stir heated discussion on cable-TV shows.
Virtually overnight,
two balding professors in their 50s had become public intellectuals,
ducking hundreds of e-mails,
phone messages and challenges to debate.
\
Titled "The Israel Lobby," the piece argued that a wide-ranging
coalition that includes
neoconservatives, Christian Zionists, leading journalists and of course
the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee, or AIPAC, exerts a "stranglehold" on Middle East
policy and public debate
on the issue. While supporting the moral cause for the existence of
Israel, the authors said there
was neither a strategic nor a moral interest in America's siding so
strongly with post-occupation
Israel. Many Americans thought the Iraq War was about oil, but "the war
was motivated in good
part by a desire to make Israel more secure."
The shock waves from the article continue to resonate. The initial
response was outrage from
Israel supporters, some likening the authors to neo-Nazis. The
Anti-Defamation League called
the paper "a classical conspiratorial anti-Semitic analysis invoking
the canards of Jewish power
and Jewish control." University of Chicago Professor Daniel Drezner
called it "piss-poor,
monocausal social science." Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz said
the men had
"destroyed their professional reputations." Even left-leaning critics
dismissed the piece as
inflammatory and wrong. As time passed (and the Ku Klux Klan remained
dormant), a more
rational debate began. The New York Times, having first downplayed the
article, printed a long
op-ed by historian Tony Judt saying that out of fear, the mainstream
media were failing to face
important ideas the article had put forward. And Col. Lawrence
Wilkerson, Colin Powell's
former chief of staff, praised it at the Middle East Institute for
conveying "blinding flashes of the
obvious," ideas "that were whispered in corners rather than said out
loud at cocktail parties where
someone else could hear you."
While criticisms of the lobby have circulated widely for years and
been published at the
periphery, the Mearsheimer-Walt paper stands out because it was so
frontal and pointed, and
because it was published online by Harvard's Kennedy School of
Government, where Walt is a
professor and outgoing academic dean. "It was inevitably going to take
someone from Harvard
[to get this discussed]," says Phyllis Bennis, a writer on Middle East
issues at the Institute for
Policy Studies.
What's more, the article appeared when public pessimism over the Iraq
War was reaching new
highs. "The paper was important as a political intervention because the
authors are squarely in
the mainstream of academic life," says Norman Finkelstein, a professor
of political science at
DePaul University dedicated to bringing the issue of Palestinian
suffering under the occupation
to Americans' attention. "The reason they're getting a hearing now is
because of the Iraq debacle."
Bennis and Finkelstein, both left-wing critics of Israel, have
criticisms of the paper's findings.
Partly this reflects the paper's origins: Though it was printed in a
left-leaning English journal, it
was written by theorists of a school associated with the center/right:
realism, which holds that the
world is a dangerous neighborhood, that good intentions don't mean very
much and that the key
to order is a balance of power among armed states. For realists, issues
like human rights and how
states treat minorities are so much idealistic fluff.
Given the paper's parentage, the ferment over it raises political
questions. How did these
ideas get to center stage? And what do they suggest about the character
of the antiwar
intelligentsia?
************************************************************************************************************************
London Review of Books | Vol. 28 No. 9 dated 11 May 2006
The Israel Lobby
From John Mearsheimer & Stephen Walt
We wrote 'The Israel Lobby' in order to begin a discussion of a subject
that had become difficult
to address openly in the United States (LRB, 23 March). We knew it was
likely to generate a
strong reaction, and we are not surprised that some of our critics have
chosen to attack our
characters or misrepresent our arguments. We have also been gratified
by the many positive
responses we have received, and by the thoughtful commentary that has
begun to emerge in the
media and the blogosphere. It is clear that many people - including
Jews and Israelis - believe
that it is time to have a candid discussion of the US relationship with
Israel. It is in that spirit that
we engage with the letters responding to our article. We confine
ourselves here to the most
salient points of dispute.
One of the most prominent charges against us is that we see the
lobby as a well-organised Jewish
conspiracy. Jeffrey Herf and Andrei Markovits, for example, begin by
noting that 'accusations of
powerful Jews behind the scenes are part of the most dangerous
traditions of modern
anti-semitism' (Letters, 6 April). It is a tradition we deplore and
that we explicitly rejected in our
article. Instead, we described the lobby as a loose coalition of
individuals and organisations
without a central headquarters. It includes gentiles as well as Jews,
and many Jewish-Americans
do not endorse its positions on some or all issues. Most important, the
Israel lobby is not a secret,
clandestine cabal; on the contrary, it is openly engaged in
interest-group politics and there is
nothing conspiratorial or illicit about its behaviour. Thus, we can
easily believe that Daniel Pipes
has never 'taken orders' from the lobby, because the Leninist
caricature of the lobby depicted in
his letter is one that we clearly dismissed. Readers will also note
that Pipes does not deny that his
organisation, Campus Watch, was created in order to monitor what
academics say, write and
teach, so as to discourage them from engaging in open discourse about
the Middle East.
Several writers chide us for making mono-causal arguments, accusing us
of saying that Israel
alone is responsible for anti-Americanism in the Arab and Islamic world
(as one letter puts it,
anti-Americanism 'would exist if Israel was not there') or suggesting
that the lobby bears sole
responsibility for the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq.
But that is not what we said.
We emphasised that US support for Israeli policy in the Occupied
Territories is a powerful
source of anti-Americanism, the conclusion reached in several scholarly
studies and US
government commissions (including the 9/11 Commission). But we also
pointed out that support
for Israel is hardly the only reason America's standing in the Middle
East is so low. Similarly, we
clearly stated that Osama bin Laden had other grievances against the
United States besides the
Palestinian issue, but as the 9/11 Commission documents, this matter
was a major concern for
him. We also explicitly stated that the lobby, by itself, could not
convince either the Clinton or
the Bush administration to invade Iraq. Nevertheless, there is abundant
evidence that the
neo-conservatives and other groups within the lobby played a central
role in making the case for
war.
At least two of the letters complain that we 'catalogue Israel's
moral flaws', while paying little
attention to the shortcomings of other states. We focused on Israeli
behaviour, not because we
have any animus towards Israel, but because the United States gives it
such high levels of
material and diplomatic support. Our aim was to determine whether
Israel merits this special
treatment either because it is a unique strategic asset or because it
behaves better than other
countries do. We argued that neither argument is convincing: Israel's
strategic value has declined
since the end of the Cold War and Israel does not behave significantly
better than most other
states.
Herf and Markovits interpret us to be saying that Israel's 'continued
survival' should be of little
concern to the United States. We made no such argument. In fact, we
emphasised that there is a
powerful moral case for Israel's existence, and we firmly believe that
the United States should
take action to ensure its survival if it were in danger. Our criticism
was directed at Israeli policy
and America's special relationship with Israel, not Israel's existence.
Another recurring theme in the letters is that the lobby ultimately
matters little because Israel's
'values command genuine support among the American public'. Thus, Herf
and Markovits
maintain that there is substantial support for Israel in military and
diplomatic circles within the
United States. We agree that there is strong public support for Israel
in America, in part because
it is seen as compatible with America's Judaeo-Christian culture. But
we believe this popularity
is substantially due to the lobby's success at portraying Israel in a
favourable light and effectively
limiting public awareness and discussion of Israel's less savoury
actions. Diplomats and military
officers are also affected by this distorted public discourse, but many
of them can see through the
rhetoric. They keep silent, however, because they fear that groups like
AIPAC will damage their
careers if they speak out. The fact is that if there were no AIPAC,
Americans would have a more
critical view of Israel and US policy in the Middle East would look
different.
On a related point, Michael Szanto contrasts the US-Israeli
relationship with the American
military commitments to Western Europe, Japan and South Korea, to show
that the United States
has given substantial support to other states besides Israel (6 April).
He does not mention,
however, that these other relationships did not depend on strong
domestic lobbies. The reason is
simple: these countries did not need a lobby because close ties with
each of them were in
America's strategic interest. By contrast, as Israel has become a
strategic burden for the US, its
American backers have had to work even harder to preserve the 'special
relationship'.
Other critics contend that we overstate the lobby's power because we
overlook countervailing
forces, such as 'paleo-conservatives, Arab and Islamic advocacy groups
. . . and the diplomatic
establishment'. Such countervailing forces do exist, but they are no
match - either alone or in
combination - for the lobby. There are Arab-American political groups,
for example, but they are
weak, divided, and wield far less influence than AIPAC and other
organisations that present a
strong, consistent message from the lobby.
Probably the most popular argument made about a countervailing force is
Herf and Markovits's
claim that the centrepiece of US Middle East policy is oil, not Israel.
There is no question that
access to that region's oil is a vital US strategic interest.
Washington is also deeply committed to
supporting Israel. Thus, the relevant question is, how does each of
those interests affect US
policy? We maintain that US policy in the Middle East is driven
primarily by the commitment to
Israel, not oil interests. If the oil companies or the oil-producing
countries were driving policy,
Washington would be tempted to favour the Palestinians instead of
Israel. Moreover, the United
States would almost certainly not have gone to war against Iraq in
March 2003, and the Bush
administration would not be threatening to use military force against
Iran. Although many claim
that the Iraq war was all about oil, there is hardly any evidence to
support that supposition, and
much evidence of the lobby's influence. Oil is clearly an important
concern for US policymakers,
but with the exception of episodes like the 1973 Opec oil embargo, the
US commitment to Israel
has yet to threaten access to oil. It does, however, contribute to
America's terrorism problem,
complicates its efforts to halt nuclear proliferation, and helped get
the United States involved in
wars like Iraq.
Regrettably, some of our critics have tried to smear us by linking
us with overt racists, thereby
suggesting that we are racists or anti-semites ourselves. Michael
Taylor, for example, notes that
our article has been 'hailed' by Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke (6
April). Alan Dershowitz
implies that some of our material was taken from neo-Nazi websites and
other hate literature (20
April). We have no control over who likes or dislikes our article, but
we regret that Duke used it
to promote his racist agenda, which we utterly reject. Furthermore,
nothing in our piece is drawn
from racist sources of any kind, and Dershowitz offers no evidence to
support this false claim.
We provided a fully documented version of the paper so that readers
could see for themselves
that we used reputable sources.
Finally, a few critics claim that some of our facts, references or
quotations are mistaken. For
example, Dershowitz challenges our claim that Israel was 'explicitly
founded as a Jewish state
and citizenship is based on the principle of blood kinship'. Israel was
founded as a Jewish state (a
fact Dershowitz does not challenge), and our reference to citizenship
was obviously to Israel's
Jewish citizens, whose identity is ordinarily based on ancestry. We
stated that Israel has a
sizeable number of non-Jewish citizens (primarily Arabs), and our main
point was that many of
them are relegated to a second-class status in a predominantly Jewish
society.
We also referred to Golda Meir's famous statement that 'there is no
such thing as a Palestinian,'
and Jeremy Schreiber reads us as saying that Meir was denying the
existence of those people
rather than simply denying Palestinian nationhood (20 April). There is
no disagreement here; we
agree with Schreiber's interpretation and we quoted Meir in a
discussion of Israel's prolonged
effort 'to deny the Palestinians' national ambitions'.
Dershowitz challenges our claim that the Israelis did not offer the
Palestinians a contiguous state
at Camp David in July 2000. As support, he cites a statement by former
Israeli prime minister
Ehud Barak and the memoirs of former US negotiator Dennis Ross. There
are a number of
competing accounts of what happened at Camp David, however, and many of
them agree with
our claim. Moreover, Barak himself acknowledges that 'the Palestinians
were promised a
continuous piece of sovereign territory except for a razor-thin Israeli
wedge running from
Jerusalem . . . to the Jordan River.' This wedge, which would bisect
the West Bank, was essential
to Israel's plan to retain control of the Jordan River Valley for
another six to twenty years.
Finally, and contrary to Dershowitz's claim, there was no 'second map'
or map of a 'final
proposal at Camp David'. Indeed, it is explicitly stated in a note
beside the map published in
Ross's memoirs that 'no map was presented during the final rounds at
Camp David.' Given all
this, it is not surprising that Barak's foreign minister, Shlomo
Ben-Ami, who was a key
participant at Camp David, later admitted: 'If I were a Palestinian I
would have rejected Camp
David as well.'
Dershowitz also claims that we quote David Ben-Gurion 'out of
context' and thus
misrepresented his views on the need to use force to build a Jewish
state in all of Palestine.
Dershowitz is wrong. As a number of Israeli historians have shown,
Ben-Gurion made numerous
statements about the need to use force (or the threat of overwhelming
force) to create a Jewish
state in all of Palestine. In October 1937, for example, he wrote to
his son Amos that the future
Jewish state would have an 'outstanding army . . . so I am certain that
we won't be constrained
from settling in the rest of the country, either by mutual agreement
and understanding with our
Arab neighbours, or by some other way' (emphasis added). Furthermore,
common sense says that
there was no other way to achieve that goal, because the Palestinians
were hardly likely to give
up their homeland voluntarily. Ben-Gurion was a consummate strategist
and he understood that it
would be unwise for the Zionists to talk openly about the need for
'brutal compulsion'. We quote
a memorandum Ben-Gurion wrote prior to the Extraordinary Zionist
Conference at the Biltmore
Hotel in New York in May 1942. He wrote that 'it is impossible to
imagine general evacuation'
of the Arab population of Palestine 'without compulsion, and brutal
compulsion'. Dershowitz
claims that Ben-Gurion's subsequent statement - 'we should in no way
make it part of our
programme' - shows that he opposed the transfer of the Arab population
and the 'brutal
compulsion' it would entail. But Ben-Gurion was not rejecting this
policy: he was simply noting
that the Zionists should not openly proclaim it. Indeed, he said that
they should not 'discourage
other people, British or American, who favour transfer from advocating
this course, but we
should in no way make it part of our programme'.
We close with a final comment about the controversy surrounding our
article. Although we are
not surprised by the hostility directed at us, we are still
disappointed that more attention has not
been paid to the substance of the piece. The fact remains that the
United States is in deep trouble
in the Middle East, and it will not be able to develop effective
policies if it is impossible to have
a civilised discussion about the role of Israel in American foreign
policy.
<>John Mearsheimer & Stephen Walt
University of Chicago & Harvard University >